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BRNOVICH V. DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE:
EXAMINING SECTION 2 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT
ARTURO NAVA*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court faces a critical juncture in shaping the future of
voting rights in the United States. The Court’s consequential holding in
Shelby County v. Holder,1 effectively striking down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), opened the floodgates for new election laws restricting the right to vote.2 Almost a decade later, Section 2,3 another
core pillar of the VRA—the current safeguard against most racially discriminatory voting laws—is in jeopardy. In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,4 consolidated with Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee,5 the Court will not only rule on the legality
of two Arizona statutes, but will likely weigh in on the appropriate test
for assessing a wide array of vote-denial claims.6 The Court’s decision
will have implications for voting rights for generations to come.7
In Brnovich, the Court will determine whether Arizona’s out-of-

Copyright © 2021 Arturo Nava
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2022. The author would like to thank
the editors on the journal for their guidance and feedback on this piece.
1 See generally Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding Section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act unconstitutional and effectively dismantling the Section 5 federal preclearance requirement).
2 Wendy Weiser and Max Feldman, The State of Voting 2018, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 5
(June 5, 2018) https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_State_of_Voting_2018.pdf.
3 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (prohibiting voting policies that result in voter disenfranchisement based on
race).
4 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020 (granting certiorari).
5 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020)(granting certiorari).
6 Amy Howe, Justices to Consider Whether Arizona’s Coting Rules Discriminate Against Minorities, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 16, 2021, 9:00 AM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/justices-toconsider-whether-arizonas-voting-rules-discriminate-against-minorities/.
7 Id.
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precinct (OOP) policy and its ballot-collection law violate Section 2 of
the VRA.8 The Ninth Circuit held that both voting provisions violate
Section 2.9 The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision, invoking the Section 2 Results Test adopted by multiple circuits,
and find that a fact-specific inquiry should be preserved in assessing
vote-denial claims.10 At a minimum, the Court should avoid establishing a bright-line rule as proposed by critics of the Section 2 Results
Test.11 Such a rigid rule runs the risk of masking the nuances that the
courts must consider when assessing a vote-denial claim for potential
racial discrimination.
I. FACTS
Arizonans have two methods of voting in elections: either in-person
or by mail.12 For in-person voting, counties can choose to either designate a specific precinct to each voter or operate county-wide “vote centers” that provide voters with flexibility in voting.13 Alternatively, voters can vote by mail as part of the State’s early voting process.14 Using
this method, voters receive a ballot in their mailbox and can choose to
either return the ballot back by mail or submit the ballot at a specified
drop-off location.15
Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy requires that voters appear on the
register of their designated voting precinct.16 If a voter is not listed on
a precinct’s register, she can cast a provisional ballot.17 To determine
whether the voter cast their ballot in the wrong precinct, the voter’s
8 Amy Howe, February Argument Calendar Includes Immigration, Coting-rights Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 31, 2020, 1:30 PM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/february-argument-calendar-includes-immigration-voting-rights-cases/.
9 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2020).
10 See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (invalidating voting policies or procedures that result in the “the denial
or abridgment” of the right to vote based on race).
11 See Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Side at 21, Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (granting certiorari), Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (granting certiorari) (filed Dec. 4, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 191258) [hereinafter Cato Amicus Brief] (suggesting the Court should articulate a jurisprudential
framework “free of balancing tests and other subjective standards”).
12 Brief of Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs in Opposition to Certiorari at 4, Brnovich,
141 S. Ct. 222 (mem.), Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221
(granting certiorari) (filed July 1, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Hobbs Brief].
13 Id.
14 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 999.
15 Id.
16 Hobbs Brief, supra note 12, at 6.
17 Id.
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registration information is then reviewed, in which case the out-of-precinct ballot is tossed out “in its entirety.”18
For over twenty-five years, Arizona has offered voting by mail.19
Since its implementation in the 1990s, Arizona has closely regulated the
practice of voting by mail by “prohibit[ing] anyone from possessing another voter’s unmarked early ballot” and “criminaliz[ing] fraudulent
ballot-collection practices, including ‘knowingly mark[ing] a voted or
unvoted ballot or ballot envelope with the intent to fix an election.’”20
Nonetheless, in 2016, the Arizona legislature passed H.B. 2023, which
criminalized “non-fraudulent third-party ballot collection.”21 Exceptions were made for a “family member, household member or caregiver
of the voter.”22 Violations would be classified as a class six felony.23
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to address racial
discrimination in voting.24 The Supreme Court substantially weakened
the Voting Rights Act in its 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder.25
In Shelby County, the Court found that the original formula used to
determine which states and counties need to seek federal clearance before modifying their voting laws was outdated.26 The Court reasoned
that there was “no longer such a [racial] disparity” in voter registration
and turnout, which had originally prompted the establishment of clearance measures that states had to abide by before modifying their voting
procedures.27 In doing so, the Supreme Court invalidated “the heart of
18 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 999; see also id. (noting that the ballot invalidation includes races for which
the OOP voter was eligible to vote for, including statewide officers, U.S. President, U.S. Senate,
and many times Members of the U.S. House of Representatives).
19 Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 839 (D. Ariz. 2018)
20 Hobbs Brief, supra note 12, at 11 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-542(D) 2019 and ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 16-1005(A) 2016).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 11–12 (citing ARIZ. STAT. § 16-1005(H), (I)(2) 2016).
23 Id. at 12 (citing ARIZ. STAT. § 16-1005(H), (I)(2) 2016).
24 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (The Act intended to establish
remedies for voting discrimination “where it persists on a pervasive scale, and . . . strengthen[ed]
existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination elsewhere in the country.”).
25 See generally 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (invalidating the Section 5 federal preclearance requirement
of the VRA).
26 See id. at 551 (“Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices.”).
27 See id. at 537 (“Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures could take effect until
it was approved by federal authorities . . . . A jurisdiction could obtain such ‘preclearance’ only
by proving that the change had neither ‘the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.’”).
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the Voting Rights Act.”28 Post-Shelby County, Section 2 has become the
bedrock of challenges to racially discriminatory voting laws in the
country.29
In its original form, Section 2 was viewed largely as a restatement
of the Fifteenth Amendment.30 Congress amended the VRA in 1982,
allowing parties to introduce Section 2 claims by either showing proof
of discriminatory intent or discriminatory impact.31 Under modern
election law jurisprudence, parties can show a violation of Section 2
through either the Results Test or the Intent Test.32 In its current
amended form, Section 2 of the VRA reads:
No voting . . . standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State . . . in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color . . . .
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political process . . . are not
equally open to participation by members of a class . . . protected by
subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.33
A. Results Test
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a two-step process when evaluating
a vote-denial challenge under the Results Test of Section 2.34 The court

28 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html.
29 See Election Law – Voting Rights – Ninth Circuit Holds Two Arizona Voting Laws are Unlawful
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 134 HARV. L. REV. 862, 862 (2020) (discussing the recent
shift to Section 2 jurisprudence in challenging discriminatory voting laws).
30 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991). Compare Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”) (emphasis added), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
31 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986)
(“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing
discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the ‘results test’ . . . .”).
32 Democratic Nat’l Comm.v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1011 (9th Cir. 2020).
33 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
34 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012.
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first determines “whether the challenged standard, practice or procedure results in a disparate burden on members of the protected class.”35
Second, the court examines whether, in considering the “totality of circumstances,” a relationship exists between the challenged practice and
sociohistorical conditions.36 Section 2’s totality of circumstances analysis is fact-specific.37 The court weighs several factors when determining
whether “a legally significant relationship” exists between the disparate burden on minority voters and the “social and historical conditions
affecting them.”38 There is no threshold of factors that must be met to
establish a valid Section 2 claim.39
B. Intent Test
Under the Intent Test, the initial burden rests on the plaintiff to
show “proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose.”40 Discriminatory intent may be inferred “from the totality of the relevant facts.”41
Plaintiffs may rely on evidence that looks at the broader context pertaining to the legislation’s enactment.42 A broad review of the evidence
is permissible because of the subtle nature of discrimination today, like
the selective placement and relocation of voting precincts in lieu of literacy tests.43 Once plaintiffs meet their burden of proof, defendants
35 Id. (recognizing that “a mere statistical disparity” is insufficient).
36 Id.
37 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986).
38 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1012–13. (outlining the Senate Report that supplemented the 1982 VRA
amendments). The list of factors includes, but is not limited to history of official discrimination in
the state affecting minority groups right to vote, extent of racially polarized elections in the state,
pattern of discriminatory practices, extent to which minority groups bear effects of discrimination
in areas such as education, employment and health, overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns, extent to which minority groups have held elected office. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.
Reagan, 329 F. Supp.3d 824, 863 (D. Ariz. 2018).
39 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (“[T]here is no requirement that any particular number of factors
be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.”).
40 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1038 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977)). Arlington Heights established a set of factors to be considered when examining
a provision, including (1) the historical background; (2) the sequence of events leading to enactment, including any substantive or procedural departures from the normal legislative process; (3)
the relevant legislative history; and (4) whether the law has a disparate impact on a particular
racial group. See 429 U.S. at 266–68.
41 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
42 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
43 See N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 221 (4th Cir. 2016) (“In a vote
denial case such as the one here, where the plaintiffs allege that the legislature imposed barriers
to minority voting, this holistic approach is particularly important, for ‘[d]iscrimination today is
more subtle than the visible methods used in 1965.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 6
(2006))).
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must prove that the law would have been enacted without racial discrimination serving as the motivating factor.44 Courts must look to the
actual non-racial motivations to determine if these motives alone can
justify the passage of the law.45
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2016, the Democratic National Committee and several affiliates
(DNC) sued the state of Arizona to challenge its out-of-precinct policy
and its ballot-collection law.46 Plaintiffs argued that the out-of-precinct
policy and H.B. 2023 violate Section 2 “by adversely and disparately
impacting the electoral opportunities of Hispanic, African American,
and Native American Arizonans.”47 Plaintiffs also argued that H.B.
2023 violates Section 2 “because it was enacted with the intent to suppress voting by Hispanic and Native American voters.”48
After a ten-day bench trial, the district court rejected the DNC’s
claims.49 First, the court held that, under the Results Test, the DNC
failed to show that both the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 “impose[d]
meaningfully disparate burdens on minority voters as compared to
non-minority voters”.50 The court found that Arizona’s OOP policy affected only a de minimis number of total voters and presented typical
burdens associated with voting.51 As to H.B. 2023, the court pointed to
the lack of quantifiable data and the relatively small number of voters
that utilize ballot-collection practices to show that no substantial burden existed.52 Second, applying the Intent Test to H.B. 2023, the district
court found that the law “was not enacted with a racially discriminatory

44 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985).
45 McCrory, 831 F.3d at 221.
46 Brief for State Petitioners at 6, Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (granting
certiorari) (filed Nov. 30, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Brief for State Petitioners]. The Arizona Republican Party, along with several elected officials, intervened as defendants.
Brief for Private Petitioners at 11, Ariz. Republican Party v. 831 F.3d 204, 141 S. Ct. 221 (granting
certiorari) (filed Nov. 30, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Brief for Private Petitioners].
47 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 6 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also made First and
Fourteenth Amendment Claims, which the district court rejected. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 329
F. Supp.3d 824, 856, 862 (D. Ariz. 2018).
48 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 6 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 9.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 9–10.
52 Id. at 10–11.
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purpose,” but rather, was introduced as an election security measure.53
In a divided decision, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed.54
Plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the Ninth Circuit granted an
en banc hearing.55 Upon en banc review, the Ninth Circuit reversed.56
First, the Ninth Circuit applied the two-step Results Test to review the
OOP policy and H.B. 2023, assessing (1) whether each policy created a
disparate burden on minority voters (beyond a mere statistical disparity) and (2) whether the totality of circumstances revealed a relationship between the policy in question and sociohistorical conditions.57
The Ninth Circuit found that Arizona’s OOP policy had a disparate
burden on minority voters in the state.58 Under the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that Arizona’s OOP policy led to inequities in minority participation in the political process. The court followed
a similar approach in assessing H.B. 2023’s validity under the Results
Test of Section 2 of the VRA. Noting that minority voters disproportionately relied on ballot collection practices outlawed by H.B. 2023
relative to whites, the court found a disparate burden existed among
minority communities as a result of the ballot-collection law.59 The
court then turned to step two—determining whether minorities had access to political processes under the totality of circumstances, finding
that the ballot collection law inhibited such access.60
Second, applying the Intent Test, the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona legislators passed H.B. 2023 with a discriminatory purpose.61 The
court highlighted the initial attempts at passing similar legislation in
2011, relying on statements made by Arizona State Senator Don

53 Id. at 11.
54 Id. Judge Ikuta was joined by Judge Bea, with Judge Thomas dissenting. See generally Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan 904 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2018).
55 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 12.
56 Id. A majority (7-4) held that the provisions in question violated the Results Test of § 2, and
(6-5) that the ballot collection law was passed with an intent to discriminate, violating both § 2
and the Fifteenth Amendment.
57 See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to Petitioners for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (mem.), Ariz. Republican Party v. Democratic Nat’l
Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (mem.) (filed Jul. 1, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Brief
for Respondents].
58 Id. at 9.
59 See id. at 13–14 (highlighting “a variety of socioeconomic-related reasons” that make in-person
voting disproportionally “difficult or impossible” for communities of color, such as community
sprawl and lack of adequate transportation in American Indian lands).
60 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 14–15.
61 Id. at 16.
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Shooter.62 Senator Shooter’s proposal failed to meet the federal preclearance requirements in place at the time.63 Additionally, a “racially
tinged” video produced by Maricopa County Republican Chair, A.J.
LaFaro, added to the racial animus that the court noted influenced the
passage of H.B. 2023.64 Ultimately, the court found that, but-for these
legislators’ actions, H.B. 2023 would not have been enacted.65
The contested decision resulted in two dissents.66 The first dissent,
penned by Judge O’Scannlain, rejected the “implicit” suggestion in the
majority’s opinion that any facially neutral law with a statistical racial
disparity is discriminatory.67 Judge O’Scannlain noted how designated
voting precincts impose only “burdens traditionally associated with
voting.”68 With regards to ballot collections, Judge O’Scannlain highlighted the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs presented no evidence to
conclude that minority voters were disparately burdened in their ability
to elect candidates of their choice.69 As to H.B. 2023’s discriminatory
intent claims, Judge O’Scannlain criticized the majority for extrapolating racial animus on behalf of the entire legislature from the actions of
one senator.70 The second dissent, penned by Judge Bybee, categorized
the practices at issue as “[t]ime, place, and manner restrictions,”71 distinguishing them from “status-based restraints.”72 He cautioned that
such conflation jeopardizes the legality of “countless ordinary election
rules.”73 Both dissents scrutinize the en bancs purportedly overbroad
interpretation of Section 2 in its challenges to the vote denial claims in
question.

62 Id. at 17.
63Id. (“According to DOJ records, Arizona’s Elections Director, who had helped draft the provision, had admitted to DOJ that the provision was ‘targeted at voting practices in predominantly
Hispanic areas.’” (quoting Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp.3d 824, 881 (D. Ariz.
2018))). See supra text accompanying note 27.
64 See id. at 18 (“The [LaFaro] video showed ‘a man of apparent Hispanic heritage’ purportedly
dropping off ballots at a polling place. LaFaro’s voice-over narration included unfounded and
racists statements, ‘that the man was acting to stuff the ballot box’ and that LaFaro ‘did not know
if the person was an illegal alien, a dreamer, or citizen, but knew that he was a thug.’”)
65 Id. at 19.
66 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 13.
67 Brief for Private Petitioners, supra note 46, at 14.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 15.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 18.
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IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners, Brnovich and the Arizona Republican Party, outline
three core arguments for upholding Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy
and H.B. 2023. First, Petitioners argue that a law violates Section 2 only
when it “causes a substantial disparity” for members of a protected
class to both take part in the political process and in their ability to
affect the outcomes of an election.74 Second, Petitioners argue that had
the Ninth Circuit properly applied the Results Test, it would have found
that the OOP policy and H.B. 2023 do not violate Section 2.75 Lastly,
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling that legislators
enacted H.B. 2023 with discriminatory intent.76
1. Substantial Disparity Requirement
Petitioners deviate from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 2 by noting that a law “results in” a vote denial only when it generates a substantial disparity in opportunity for minority voters to engage in the electoral process.77 Articulating their own two-part test in
challenging voting laws under Section 2, Petitioners argue that Section
2 requires laws to provide equal treatment, rather than to guarantee
equal outcomes, to the general population.78
The first step is to assess whether “plaintiffs have identified a substantial disparate impact on minority voters’ ability to participate in the
electoral process and to elect representatives of their choice[.]”79 The
racial disparity must be so substantial as to demonstrate that the burden extends beyond the typical burdens associated with voting, and in
fact “deni[es] or abridg[es]” minority voters’ right to vote.80 The court
must assess the voting system as a whole to determine whether the disparate burden is substantial.81 If the first step is met, the court must
then determine whether “[the] substantial disparate impact is caused

74 Id.
75 Id. at 33.
76 Id. at 45.
77 Id. at 18.
78 Id. at 14.
79 Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 15.
80 Id. at 14.
81 Id. (“Isolating one provision’s alleged impact from the opportunities provided by the State’s
entire system flouts Section 2’s command to consider ‘the totality of circumstances.’”).
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by the challenged law[.]”82 Here, Plaintiff’s must establish a “causal
connection” between the law in question and the substantial disparate
impact.83 Both parts are analyzed under the “totality of circumstances.”84
Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit applied a less demanding
standard for providing a Section 2 vote-denial claim than what the text
requires.85 They allege the Ninth Circuit has established an “any-thingmore-than-de-minimis-impact-suffices” standard.86 Petitioners further
argue that the Ninth Circuit steered away from requiring a causal connection between the challenged law and the substantial disparity.87
2. Plaintiffs Fail to Meet the Substantial Disparity Threshold
According to Petitioners, Plaintiffs failed to prove that Arizona’s
OOP policy and H.B. 2023 created a substantial disparity in electoral
opportunities for minority voters in the state.88 With regards to the
State’s OOP policy, Petitioners note that the “race-neutral” OOP policy gives all voters the “equal opportunity” to vote in their designated
precinct, or to choose from the various voting options available.89 Further, Petitioners find the Ninth Circuit’s “totality of circumstances” review insufficient.90 They then argue that Plaintiffs failed to show the
OOP policy caused voters to disproportionately vote at the wrong precinct.91 Lastly, Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in applying
the Gingles factors in this context, a vote denial case.92
Petitioners raise a similar argument for the ballot-collection law.
First, Petitioners note that Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial disparity in minority voters’ engagement in the electoral process.93 Noting
that the DNC provided no quantitative data about the impact of ballotcollection laws on minority voters, Plaintiffs allegedly relied solely on

82 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 23.
84 Id. at 19.
85 Id. at 24.
86 Id. at 25.
87 Id. at 24.
88 Id. at 33.
89 Id. at 16–17.
90 Id. at 36.
91 See Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 17.
92 Id. at 39 (noting that making a state liable for non-parties’ actions through historical conditions
of discrimination is an overextension of Section 2 beyond its textual limits).
93 Id. at 40.
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“select anecdotes.”94 Petitioners argue that, even taking anecdotes at
face value, no substantial disparity exists because only a small portion
of Arizona voters make use of the ballot-collection practice.95 As such,
it is impossible to find a causal relationship between H.B. 2023’s passage and its role in establishing a substantial disparity in minority voter
engagement because there is no evidence that a disparity exists to begin
with.96
3. Ninth Circuit’s Legal Error in Finding Intentional Discrimination
Additionally, Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that legislators enacted H.B. 2023 with discriminatory intent. They
first contend the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the cat’s paw theory in
“imput[ing] unlawful intent” to members of the Arizona Legislature.”97
They then challenge the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion that election-integrity measures must be implemented only in response to election issues
within the state.98 Instead, states can take “proactive efforts” to combat
voter fraud, and insisting otherwise, according to Petitioners, breaks
with the Court’s precedent.99
B. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, the Democratic National Committee and Secretary
Hobbs, outline two primary arguments in favor of upholding the Ninth
Circuit’s en banc decision. First, the Ninth Circuit properly applied the
Section 2 Results Test.100 Second, the Ninth Circuit properly applied the
Intent Test in holding that legislators enacted H.B. 2023 with a discriminatory purpose.101
1. The Ninth Circuit Properly Applied the Section 2 Results Test
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the Results Test under Section 2 for assessing vote-denial claims.102 They argue

94 Id. at 41.
95 Id. at 41–42.
96 Id. at 43.
97 See Brief for State Petitioners, supra note 46, at 46 (distinguishing the Congressional setting,
where legislators are viewed as co-equals, from an employment setting, where there are hierarchical employment relationships).
98 Id. at 47.
99 Id. at 47–48.
100 Id. at 20.
101 Id. at 33.
102 Id. at 20.
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Petitioners mischaracterized the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision when
concluding that the Ninth Circuit finds Section 2 violations any time
there is more than a de minimis impact on minority voters.103 Respondents stress that a bare statistical showing of a disparate impact is not
enough to establish a Section 2 violation.104 Rather, the Court properly
applied a “fact-intensive, two-part test” derived from Section 2’s plain
text, which was further established in Gingles.105
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis met both
prongs of the Section 2 Results Test.106 They note that the Ninth Circuit
properly applied the first prong when the court determined that a significant number of minority voters were impacted by both the OOP
policy and H.B. 2023 (far more than de minimis), leading to a disparate
impact on minority voters.107 Respondents then highlight the Ninth Circuit’s application of the second prong, the totality of circumstances
analysis.108 They argue that the second-prong’s “intensely local appraisal” of a given policy will lead to a Section 2 violation only in instances where a policy “operat[es] in a specific way in a specific context.”109 Respondents contend that the two-prong approach would not
undermine any facially neutral election law simply on the basis of its
disparate impact on minority voters, as Petitioners allege.110 To lend
support to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, Respondents point to unique
local election practices in Arizona: including the State’s historic use of
ballot collection practices, precinct assignments, and precinct relocations.111
Respondents argue that Petitioners are “[f]undamentally misunderstanding Section 2.”112 They take issue with the Petitioners interpretation of Section 2 requiring laws to provide equal treatment, rather than

103 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 20.
104 Id. at 5.
105 Id. at 20; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 78, 80 (1986) (articulating the need for
an “intensely local appraisal” of North Carolina’s redistricting plan and holding that the contested
policy prevented black voters from engaging in the electoral process).
106 See id., at 20–21.
107 Id. at 20.
108 Id. at 21.
109 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 21–22.
110 Id. Respondent cites to the Fifth Circuit as a sister court that reasoned similarly. See Veasey
v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 246 (5th Cir. 2016).
111 Id. at 22–23.
112 Id. at 24.
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focusing on the outcomes of a challenged law—claiming this interpretation is at odds with Section 2’s text and the Court’s precedent established in Gingles. To bolster this claim, they highlight the fact that the
Ninth Circuit’s Results Test parallels the application of the Section 2
test adopted by other circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits.113 Respondents focus on the two distinct presentations of a circuit split provided by Private Petitioners and State Petitioners to argue that such a split has been fabricated.114
2. The Ninth Circuit’s Discriminatory Intent Holding Should Be
Upheld
Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit properly applied the Intent Test.115 Under the Intent Test, the plaintiff must show racially discriminatory intent or purpose as a motivating factor for the provision.116 Respondents argue that the Ninth Circuit properly applied Arlington Heights factors to the facts of the case, leading to a narrow, factspecific outcome.117 They present two incidents of explicit discriminatory episodes that transpired in the lead up to the passage of the act.118
This includes a racially tinged video released by Maricopa County Republican Chair, A.J. LaFaro, to stoke fear surrounding minority ballot
collection practices, in addition to false allegations from Arizona State
Senator Don Shooter when proposing a bill to limit the practice.119 Respondents additionally note that Petitioners mischaracterized the
“cat’s paw” doctrine, incorrectly implying that the Ninth Circuit

113 Id. at 26. See also Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 244–45 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding a district
court’s finding that Texas’s requirement that a photo ID be presented at the time of voting violated the Results Test); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district court clearly erred in finding that the Results Test had
not been violated by North Carolina’s elimination of same-day registration, and by North Carolina’s practice of wholly discarding out-of-precinct ballots); Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v.
Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding a district court’s finding that an Ohio law
limiting early voting violated the Results Test of Section 2).
114 See id. at 26–27 (contrasting State Petitioner Brnovich’s claim that the Ninth Circuit’s decision
clashes with all other Circuits and Private Petitioner Republicans’ assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision is at odds with a handful of Circuits and aligns with the Fifth Circuit).
115 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 33.
116 Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1038 (9th Cir. 2020).
117 Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 33.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 34–35.
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adopted the doctrine to show that all legislatures acted with discriminatory intent.120 Instead, Respondents point to the specific factual circumstances showing that many legislators were “heavily influenced by
demonstrably false and racially motivated allegations.”121
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has recognized that racial discrimination in the
electoral process is pervasive in American society.122 In Bartlett v. Strickland, the Court articulated the importance of Section 2 when addressing racial discrimination and the right to vote.123 Since the Bartlett decision in 2009, twenty-eight states have passed measures that have
made it more difficult to vote, and state officials have also spearheaded
efforts to restrict the vote.124 These restrictions yield disproportionate
impacts on minority voters. These actions are a modern revival of the
voter suppression efforts that inspired the passage of the Voting Rights
Act over five decades ago.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act serves as the modern-day safeguard to protect minority voters from racial discrimination in the electoral process post–Shelby County v. Holder. As such, it is essential that
the Supreme Court affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision. First, the Court
should strike down Arizona’s OOP policy under the Results Test of
Section 2. Under the totality of circumstances, the Court should find
that the policy led to a disparate impact on minority voters’ ability to
take part in the electoral process. Second, while a challenge to H.B. 2023
under the Results Test is likely premature, the Court should nonetheless strike down the law under the Intent Test—finding that racial discrimination served as a motivating factor in criminalizing certain thirdparty ballot-collection practices in the State.
The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy violates Section 2 under the Results

120 Id. at 36.
121 Id.
122 See 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (“[R]acial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history.”).
123 See id. (“Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal opportunity
to share and participate in our democratic process and traditions; and § 2 must be interpreted to
ensure that continued progress.”).
124 LaShawn Warren, Voting discrimination is getting worse, not better, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18,
2021, 11:41 AM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/02/voting-discrimination-is-getting-worse-notbetter/.
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Test. In doing so, the Court should formally validate the two-step Results Test adopted by the Ninth Circuit and sister circuits. Arizona’s
OOP policy indisputably had a disproportionate impact on minority
voters.125 With 3,709 out-of-precinct ballots cast in Arizona, the disparate impact extends beyond a de minimis number of voters.126 Further,
under the totality of circumstances, it is clear that the State’s history of
discrimination and the State’s recent precinct reassignments have led
to a heightened burden for communities of color. These negative consequences directly stem from the OOP policy.
The complexity of racial discrimination inherently calls for the balancing test invoked by the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Section 2
Results Test. The history of racial discrimination in the United States is
complex; social and historical conditions that have bred racial discrimination differ from one jurisdiction to the next. Petitioners, however,
argue that the Ninth Circuit’s two-part test will undermine any facially
neutral law that has a disparate impact on minority voters.127 Further,
third-party critics, like the Cato Institute, which filed a neutral amicus
brief, have proposed that the Court draw a bright-line rule “free of balancing tests and other subjective standards.”128 By adopting such a rigid
approach, the Court would overlook the nuances of pervasive racial
discrimination which continue to plague American democracy. Likewise, the approach undermines the original purpose that animated the
VRA’s passage over five decades ago.
Regarding H.B. 2023, the Respondents’ challenge under the Results
Test of Section 2 is likely premature. The district court’s findings indicate that the ballot collection ban may likely have a disparate impact
on minority communities.129 Section 2, however, requires Respondents
to show with certainty that a disparate impact exists.130 Here, anecdotal
evidence, by itself, is likely insufficient to show that the ballot collection
ban would result in a disparate burden on minority voters.
Nonetheless, the Court should strike down H.B. 2023 under Section
125 See Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1014 (“Uncontested evidence in the district court established that
minority voters in Arizona cast OOP ballots at twice the rate of white voters.”).
126 Id. at 1015.
127 See Brief for Private Petitioners, supra note 46, at 41 (“[Section] 2 cannot be a freestanding
ban on ordinary voting laws that lead to racially disparate outcomes.”).
128 Cato Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 21.
129 Hobbs, 948 F.3d at 1032–33.
130 See id. at 1012 (“First, we ask whether the challenged standard, practice or procedure results
in a disparate burden on members of the protected class.”) (emphasis added).
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2’s Intent Test. Arizona’s legacy of race-based discrimination in the
electoral process persists to this day, at times in overt ways.131 Most recently, legislative efforts to unsuccessfully pass a less restrictive version
of the same law were challenged through the preclearance process formerly in place through Section 5 of the VRA.132 Additionally, the legislative history of H.B. 2023 shows the use of a video with racial overtones to stoke fear surrounding minority ballot collection practices.133
The district court found that “H.B. 2023 would not have been enacted
without racial discrimination as a motivating factor”134 and therefore
violated the Intent Test. Thus, while the Court has reason to uphold
H.B. 2023 under the Results Test of Section 2, it should strike down the
law under the Intent Test.
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT
On March 2nd, the Court engaged in almost two hours of oral arguments for the two consolidated cases. During Private Petitioner Arizona Republican Party’s oral argument, the Court primarily sought to
clarify the equal opportunity framework proposed by Petitioner for assessing Section 2 claims. Chief Justice Roberts asked explicitly whether
the test proposed by Respondents was an Intent Test rather than a Results Test.135 Justice Breyer sought clarification on how the usual burdens of voting fit within the equal opportunity framework proposed by
Petitioner.136 Justice Sotomayor adopted a textualist approach to challenge Petitioner on its interpretation of the text of Section 2, noting that
there is no mention of “equal opportunity” in the language of the statute.137 Justice Kagan provided a set of hypotheticals describing instances of facially neutral laws that were likely to have a disparate im-

131 See id. at 1017–26 (documenting Arizona’s history of race-based discrimination against minority groups in the State).
132 See id. at 1007-08 (describing the legislative history of the precursor to H.B. 2023 – S.B. 1412,
which was withdrawn by the Arizona Attorney General after failing to complete the preclearance
process).
133 Id. at 1009.
134 Id. at 1042–43.
135 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct.
222 (mem.), Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic National Committee, 141 S. Ct. 221 (granting certiorari) (filed Dec. 4, 2020) (Nos. 19-1257 and 19-1258) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
136 Id. at 13–16.
137 Id. at 19.
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pact on minority voters to challenge the justification for an equal opportunity framework.138
In State Petitioner Brnovich’s oral argument, the Court focused on
the substantial disparate impact standard that Petitioner articulates in
its brief. Chief Justice Roberts took a textualist approach similar to Justice Sotomayor, inquiring about where the word ‘substantial’ can be
found in the text of Section 2.139 Justice Gorsuch asked why the policies
in question might not rise to the level of having a substantial burden on
minority voters.140
During Respondents Democratic National Committee and Secretary Hobbs’s oral arguments, the Court focused on three core themes:
the disparate impact in outcomes for minority voters as a result of a
specific policy, the totality of circumstances analysis and the relationship between legislative context and discriminatory intent. First, several
conservative justices—including Justice Thomas, Justice Alito and Justice Barrett—focused on statistical racial disparities arising from facially neutral laws, and the threat that Respondents’ disparate impact
framework could have on such laws.141 Justice Thomas pointed to the
small number of minority voters impacted by Arizona’s OOP policy.142
Justice Alito and Justice Barrett provided hypotheticals which presented facially neutral voting laws that resulted in statistical racial disparities in electoral participation.143 Respondents tried to correct the
Justices by emphasizing how the Results Test is designed to look beyond mere statistical disparities, diving into the disparate impact under
the totality of circumstances.144
Second, several justices—including Justice Roberts, Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh—drew on an expansive interpretation of
the totality of circumstances analysis. Rather than focusing on the social and historical conditions of Arizona, these justices examined the
federal factors at play, including a federal administrative commission
from 2005 which advised against ballot collection practices. The justices

138 Id. at 23–28.
139 Id. at 40.
140 Id. at 57.
141 Id. at 69–77.
142 Id. at 69–71.
143 Id. at 74–77, 90–93.
144 Id.
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also noted the existence of out-of-precinct practices and ballot collection bans that exist in other states.145
Lastly, the justices also focused on Respondent’s approach toward
showing discriminatory intent. Sotomayor questioned how Respondents could prove the Arizona legislature as a whole acted with discriminatory intent under the racially motivated actions of a handful of legislators.146 Justice Roberts similarly requested clarification as to how
discriminatory intent could be shown, and pressed Respondent on the
limited evidence in the present case available to show such intent.147
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to assess the Results Test
derived from Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court should uphold the Ninth Circuit decision in challenging Arizona’s out-of-precinct
policy and ballot-collection ban on the grounds that the policy violates
Section 2 of the VRA. While many circuit courts have adopted the Results Test, the test has yet to be validated by the Supreme Court. If the
Court were to invalidate the Results Test as currently adopted by circuits around the country, the Section 2 safeguard, as we know it, runs
the risk of becoming obsolete. This would parallel the collapse of Section 5 of the VRA.
Identifying and challenging racially discriminatory practices in this
day and age requires a nuanced approach that necessitates a holistic
balancing test to be effective. The Results Test derived from Section 2,
currently adopted by circuit courts around the country, embraces this
holistic approach. As such, the Supreme Court should lay to rest efforts
to dismantle Section 2—recognizing that the currently adopted Section
2 Results Test serves as the proper form of challenging vote-denial
claims. The Court’s expansive view of the totality of circumstances
analysis, expressed during oral arguments, lends itself to justifying Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy. Likewise, the Court’s skepticism towards
a discriminatory enactment of H.B. 2023 signals that the Court is likely
to uphold the ballot-collection ban. It remains less clear whether the
Court will articulate any broader guidance as to Section 2’s Results
Test.

145 Id. at 65–68, 82–89.
146 Id. at 77–79.
147 Id. at 99–101.
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